Many have the mistaken impression that the Jewish religion places much emphasis on death and respect for the dead; after all, we recite kaddish, yizkor, observe shiva, and yahrzeit, etc. This is a gross misunderstanding. The respect that we show for the dead is a carryover from the respect that we show for the living. The Gemorah (Kesubos 17a, see Shitah Mekubetzes) tells us that whenever there is a conflict between kovod ha’chayim and kovod ha’meisim, kovod ha’chaim takes precedence. When the chevra kadisha brings in the aron at a funeral, everyone stands up. People mistakenly think that we stand up out of respect for the niftar, but in many cases we never stood up for him when he was alive, so why should we stand up for him now that he passed away? The Bartenurah (Mishnayos Bikurim 3:3) explains that we are not standing up out of respect for the niftar but rather out of respect for the members of the chevra kaddisha who are presently involved in the fulfillment of a mitzvah. The respect for the living is based on the premise that all human beings were created b’tzelem Elokim. When the Torah requires us to demonstrate kovod ha’meis, it means that even after the person passed away and no longer has tzelem Elokim, i.e. a neshama, we still have to act respectfully towards the body because it used to have a tzelem Elokim.
Of the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos, one of the most important is the mitzvah of v’chai bohem v’lo sh’yomus bohem (Yoma 85b). Not only does the halacha require that if there is a sofek sakanah we must violate almost all of the mitzvos in the Torah to save a life, but we are also required to do so even if there is only a s’fek s’feika, a remote possibility(Yoma 85a). The Gemorah (ibid) adds that even if the likelihood is that by violating Shabbos or whatever other aveira we most probably will not be saving anyone’s life, we still do not abstain from the action due to that likelihood (rove – majority).
When Bnei Yisroel were traveling in the midbar for 40 years, the weather conditions were such that there was a slight sakanah in performing bris milah. Most of the sh’votim did not fulfill the mitzvah except for sheivet Levi. They had an Orthodox rabbi among them, i.e. Moshe Rabbeinu. Why didn’t all the shevatim ask him what to about this sofek sakanah? If it is a real sofek sakanah he should not have permitted sheivet Levi to perform the mitzvah despite their pietistic protests, and if the sofek sakanah was so insignificant that it simply should have been dismissed, why didn’t he insist that all the shevatim perform the mitzvah of milah?
The Gemorah (Yevamos 12b) tells us that the answer is to be found in Tehillim (116:6), “Shomer p’soyim Hashem.” Whenever there is a slight sofek sakanah that is nowhere near fifty-fifty, the halacha declares that it depends on the attitude of the patient. If the patient whose life is at risk (or the parent of the patient who is responsible for his well-being) is personally not nervous about the danger, then the halacha does not consider it a sofek sakanah; we apply “Shomer p’soyim Hashem.” But if the patient whose life is at risk is nervous and concerned about the sofek sakanah, then the halacha requires us to act based on, “V’chai bohem v’lo sh’yomus bohem”, and the sofek sakanah takes precedence over almost all of the mitzvos of the Torah. Shevet Levi had bitachon, and therefore were not concerned, and therefore for their children it was not considered a sofek sakanah, but with respect to the other shevatim who were concerned it was in fact a sofek sakanah, so every shevet was acting k’din.
However, if one individual is not concerned, but the nature of the sakanah is such that everyone is interdependent and the individual who personally is not nervous may possibly spread a disease to others who are concerned about its spread, then the concept of Shomer p’soyim Hashem does not apply. The individual who is not concerned does not have the right to determine for the others who are concerned that there is no sakanah for them.
The Rakanti relates that one of Ba’alei Ha’tosfos was deathly sick before Yom Kippur and the doctors warned him that if he fasts he will certainly die but if he eats on Yom Kippur there is a slim chance that he may survive. He decided to fast, and of course he died. All of the Ba’alei Ha’tosfos were upset over his decision and felt that he went against the halacha.
If a terrorist threatens to kill me unless I violate one of the mitzvos of the Torah, the halacha usually is that pikuach nefesh takes precedence over most of the mitzvos in the Torah. What if an individual wants to put up a fight knowing that he may well lose his life but thinks that by being moser nefesh he will fulfill the mitzvah of kiddush Hashem? This matter was a famous dispute amongst the Rishonim. The Rambam’s opinion is that one may not volunteer to give up his life al kiddush Hashem when not required by halacha because this is tantamount to suicide. Many other Rishonim disagreed with the Rambam. However, if there is no terrorist pressuring me to violate my religion, but there is merely a dangerous situation of sickness then all of the Ba’alei Ha’tosfos agreed with the Rambam that it would not constitute a midas chassidus to ignore the sakanah.
In determining what is a sakanah and what is not, the practice of the Tanoim always was to follow the doctors of their generation. Every so often the Rambam would take a stand on a medical issue against what it says in the Gemorah and the Chasam Sofer (Teshuvos, Yoreh Deah #101) explains that the Rambam was a doctor and he did exactly as the Tanoim did, namely, to follow the doctors of his generation. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 331:9) also says explicitly that we follow the doctors of our generation even in contradiction to the medicine recommended in the Gemorah. We should certainly do the same as the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch and follow the doctors of our generation in determining what is considered a sakanah and what is not considered a sakanah.
Some well-meaning individuals have blown out of halachic proportion the significance of tefillah b’tzibur and talmud Torah b’rabim and have opted to ignore the sofek sakanah presented by the corona virus when in conflict with these two most important mitzvos. We live in a generation where many b’nei Torah tend to exaggerate the significance of Torah and tefillah. Although their intention is certainly l’shaim Shomayim, we must all keep in mind that when paskening shailos, one may not rely on an exaggeration.
All exaggerations by definition are sheker – a misrepresentation of the truth of the Torah. Rav Chaim Volozhiner signs off quite a few of his teshuvos saying, “Keil Emes, Nosan lanu Toras Emes, u’bilti el ho’emes eineinu – the true God gave us the true Torah, and we only look for the truth.” Any exaggeration in the area of Torah and halacha is clearly a misrepresentation of our religion. The commentaries on Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 157) refer to the comments of the Maharshal in his sefer Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kamma 38a) that to misrepresent a law of the Torah constitutes an aveira related to avodah zorah and as such would be subject to the principle of yeihoreig v’al ya’avor.
With respect to a sofek sakanah the halacha clearly requires that we go extremely l’chumrah. Especially religious Jews, who know that they are charged with a mission in life, should certainly be extremely machmir on matters of sofek sakanah.
Although every word of a poem appears in the dictionary, the poet conveys an idea by putting the words in a certain order. So too, different people can have the same ideas and the same principles, but if you put them in a different arrangement you have changed the whole understanding if each one of the principles. Once you exaggerate the significance of any particular mitzvah, you have misrepresented the whole picture of kol haTorah kula.
 See Rashi, Devarim 33:9.
 See Achiezer, volume 1, #23,2.
 Siman 166; see Teshuvos Dvar Yehoshua, vol. 2 #94
 Hilchos Yesodei haTorah, 5:1.
 See Mishna Berura 328:6.
 Because we believe that the Torah is a description of the essence of G-d, misrepresenting the Torah is tantamount to misrepresenting G-d Himself
 Thoughts 1:22, by Blaise Pascal